We introduce and investigate a range of general notions of a game. Our principal notion is based on a set of agents modifying a relational structure in a discrete evolution sequence. We also introduce and study a variety of ways to model partial and erroneous information in the setting. We discuss the connection of the related general setting to logic and computation formalisms, with emphasis on the recently introduced Turing-complete logic based on game-theoretic semantics.
Introduction
We introduce and investigate a range general formalisations of the notion of a game. Games here refer to multiplayer interaction systems as conceived in, e.g., the field of multiagent systems. Our main formalisation is an iterative setting where the players jointly modify a relational structure in a discrete sequence of steps. The approach is quite general, and generality is indeed one of our principal aims.
To gain intuition into the setting, the relational structures can be considered, e.g., to represent the board of some board game-chess for example-at different points of time. The individual pawns and other pieces can then be naturally modeled by constant symbols or singleton predicates, for example. The players move the pieces about, i.e., modify the relational structure.
In the general setting, we put no limitations to what the modifications could be like in a particular scenario. It may be possible to remove domain elements and introduce new ones to the structures. Likewise, it may be possible to remove tuples from the relations of the structures and introduce new ones. Each game round corresponds intuitively to a new, modified structure. In any particular modeling scenario, only the game rules restrict the set of allowed modifications in each round. A function modeling chance is also included into the setting to enable investigations requiring related features and capacities.
Board games, however, are only a starting point. The setting we define is intended to provide a very general modeling framework. The framework aims to offer a wide range of options for studying different kinds of interaction scenarios involving a concrete dynamic environment (the changing relational structures) and a set of agents acting in that environment. This will then be connected to a very general approch to logic using a powerful, Turingcomplete logic formalism introduced recently in [7] . The logic provides a full range of ways to formally control the new setting.
Using relational structures as the starting point of our formal systems has two principal advantages. Firstly, relational structures are highly general as well as natural, being able to model more or less everything in a flexible way. Secondly, relational structures enable us to directly use different logics to control the time evolution and flow of changing structures.
Logic plays a crucial role in our study. We first observe that the Turingcomplete logic L of [7] is intimately connected to our main formalisation of the notion of a game. Indeed, the evaluation of formulae via the gametheoretic semantics of L is all about modifying relational strucures, so L can be viewed as a particular game system included in our formal framework of games. Conversely, we briefly analyse ways to directly simulate formal game evolutions of our framework within the setting of L. Moreover, we discuss further general ways to control game systems via logic, including, e.g., ways of representing knowledge of agents and beyond.
In addition to obviously considering perfect information scenarios, we introduce a simple and natural yet highly general way to deal with partial and potentially false information. The approach is based on two maps. The perception map provides-based on the current relational structure-a mental model that reflects the way an agent sees the actual current world (i.e., the current relational structure) and other relevant factors concerning the agent. The agent then acts, in one way or another, using the mental model to decide upon the particular course of action. The chosen actions can depend on the agent's (possibly limited) reasoning capacities. All this is captured formally by a decision map that takes the mental model as an input and outputs a specific action. The mental model can be a relational structure, but we also consider more elaborate approaches to better account for incomplete information issues.
To supplement our principal notion of a system, we also consider some generalizations. For example, we consider ways to abstract away the discrete iteration steps leading from a structure to another. This gives rise to a potentially continuous flow of structures. Furthermore, the approach provides a way to model situations with infinite past, cyclic time, et cetera.
There is of course a vast literature investigating notions related to our study, especially in the field of multiagent systems [16] . The concurrent game models used in Alternating-time temporal logic [1] relate to our notion of a game system, but the main focus is not on relational structures there. In first-order temporal logics (see, e.g., [6] and the references therein), however, the setting typically involves a flow of relational structures. Formalisms that bear some similarity to the original motivations of the logic L, as given in [7] , include, e.g., Abstract State Machines [3] , but that approach is-unlike L-only remotely related to our study of multiagent interactions. The idea that the general notion of a game should be formulated in terms of agents jointly modifying a relational structure (or model) has been stated in [8, 9] and formulated in further detail in [13] . We elaborate on those suggestions, developing an elaborate notion of a game system and drawing links with logic. This leads to a framework with a reasonably flexible capacity to model more or less every possible dynamic interaction scenario.
Our approach is foundational and thus we provide relatively detailed discussions of most definitions we give, justifying the theoretical and formal choices. After the brief technical preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce and discuss formal notions of a system (i.e., notions of a game or interaction framework) in Section 3. In Section 4 we then draw connections to logic, especially the Turing-complete logic L, but also other systems. In addition to considering the connections of L to games, we also directly analyse some of the more fundamental properties of the logic.
Preliminaries
The power set of a set S is denoted by P(S). For any signature σ, the empty σ-structure is in general allowed. Note that the empty sructure is not the same object as ∅. We suppose this holds holds even if σ = ∅.
A structure (or model) typically refers to a first-order model as conceived in standard logic. However, below structures can also be more general objects, such as-to name a few of the many possibilities-sets or classes of firstorder structures; sets of logical formulas; first-order models with relations having probabilistic weights on the relation tuples; or pairs (B, f ) where B is a first-order model and f and assignment function mapping some set of variable symbols into the domain of B. This generality can be advantageous. For example, a set of first-order structures can represent a set of conceived possible worlds, while a reasonable setting for modeling quantum phenomena could be to consider sets of first-order models, each model having a complex number weight. 1 However, standard relational first-order models are by far the most important notion of a structure that we consider below, providing background intuitions for most of the discussed technical as well as conceptual issues. However, we use the word model as a synonym for structure, and refer to first-order models when it is indeed only standard first-order models that we are considering.
We assume that each structure can be associated with a signature σ that relates to the objects of that structure. In the paradigmatic case of standard first-order models, the signature is as defined in standard logic. We define relational first-order models to have a purely relational signature, so constant symbols and obviously function symbols are not included. First-order models are not assumed to be finite by default, as is sometimes the case in mathematics relating to computation (especially finite model theory).
Systems
In this section we define a general notion of a system. We begin with some preliminary definitions.
Consider a triple (σ, A, I), where σ is a signature, A a set of actions and I a set of agents (or agent names). Let S be a set of σ-structures. An (S, A, I)-sequence is a finite sequence (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k , a k )
where B i ∈ S and a i ∈ A I for each i ≤ k. We note that also the empty sequence, denoted by ǫ, is considered an (S, A, I)-sequence. Definition 3.1. A system frame base over (σ, A, I) is a pair (S, F ) such that the following conditions hold: 1. S is a set of σ-structures.
2. F is a function F : T → P(S), where T is some subset of the set of all (S, A, I)-sequences.
Intuitively, a system frame base consists of a set S of possible worlds and a function F that (nondeterministically) indicates how finite sequences of possible worlds are allowed to evolve to longer sequences. The sequences correspond to time evolutions of possible worlds.
In a bit more detail, consider a sequence (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k−1 , a k−1 , B k ) of possible worlds B i and (tuples of) actions a i ∈ A I carried out 2 in those possible worlds. This sequence ends with the possible world B k that could be considered the current possible world, or the current state of affairs. Now, if the tuple of actions a k ∈ A I is carried out in the current possible world B k , we get the extended sequence (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k , a k ).
Now the function F gives the set F (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k , a k ) of new possible worlds, and one these worlds will ultimately become the new current possible world. Note indeed that F does not deterministically give a single new current possible world, but instead only a set of new candidates.
In the special case where F outputs the empty set, it is natural to interpret the situation so that the actions a k lead to termination of the evolution.
Note also that the domain of the function F is specified to be a subset T of the set of all (S, A, I)-sequences, with no particular restrictions on T . Thus it can happen that F is defined even on some (S, A, I)-sequences that do not belong to the set T F of all possible sequences that F gives rise to. 3 This feature could of course be avoided by putting extra conditions on F . But, this extra flexibility and generality in the definition of F can also be beneficial. 4 Since F is indeed a partial function on the set of (S, A, I)-sequences, there indeed may be cases where F gives no output. This is subtly different from the case where F outputs the empty set. Supposing F is undefined on the input t = (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k , a k ), we can interpret this to mean, e.g., that the tuple a k contains some forbidden actions in the possible world B k when the history leading to B k is (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . , B k−1 , a k−1 ). If an evolution terminates this way due a tuple of actions that is not allowed, the situation is indeed subtly different from termination resulting in from F outputting ∅ (which corresponds to termination via an allowed tuple of actions). Of course-in different scenarios-one could talk about possible or available actions rather than allowed and forbidden actions. It all depends on the background interpretations. 2 The actions in ai can most naturally be considered to be carried simultaneously in Bi. However, interpreting these actions simultaneous is by no means the only possibility. 3 The set TF is the set of sequences obtained by starting from the empty sequence ǫ and inductively generating all possible sequences according to what F outputs. 4 For example, we could define some function Fr according to some natural behaviour restriction r and then study what kinds of evolutions the function Fr would allow when starting from a sequence t = ∅ such that t ∈ TF r .
It is often natural to allow non-actions in addition to actions. Then we can define A so that it contains a special symbol (or perhaps many special symbols) that correspond to taking no action whatsoever. For example, suppose A = {x, y} with x indicating no action taken and y corresponding to some action. Let I = {0, 1}. Then the tuples (x, x), (x, y) and (y, x) correspond to situations with non-actions. If F is undefined, say, on some sequence ending with (x, x), then this can correspond for example to a scenario where at least one action in the action tuple is required and the total non-action tuple (x, x) is simply not allowed or somehow impossible. Now, F is indeed nondeterministic in the sense that it only gives a set of new possible worlds in a frame base (S, F ). Therefore, to decide which one of the new possible worlds given by F becomes the new current possible world, we define the notion of a system frame. The key is simply to define a choice function G that picks a new possible world from the set of possibilities given by F . Definition 3.2. A system frame over (σ, A, I) is triple (S, F, G) such that the following conditions hold:
1. (S, F ) is a system frame base as defined above.
where T is the set of all (S, A, I)-sequences. For all inputs (t, W ) where G is defined and G((t, W )) = end, we require that G((t, W )) ∈ W .
Intuitively, G simply chooses one option from the set W of possible worlds given by F , and this choice depends also on the history t ∈ T . When G outputs end, the interpretation can be that G terminates the evolution of the underlying system. When G is undefined, we can interpret this for example to indicate that G has no resources to determine the output. Note also that G is undefined or outputs end always when F outputs ∅. This reflects the idea that if evolution is terminated due to F , then G complies with this and the evolution indeed will not continue.
The background intuitions between F and G are different; while F provides a set of restrictions on how a system could potentially evolve, G determines, within those restrictions, how the system then actually evolves. Thus F can be seen as providing the rules how a system must evolve, and G is a bit like, e.g., luck or chance that then determines what happens within the allowed constraints. More on the interpretation of F and G (and beyond) will be given later on.
We are now ready to define the notion of a system. To this end, we first define that a structure-ended (S, A, I)-sequence is any sequence that can be obtained by extending an (S, A, I)-sequence by some structure in S. More formally, a structure ended (S, A, I)-sequence is a sequence
where (B 0 , a 0 , . . . , B k−1 , a k−1 ) is an (S, A, I)-sequence and B k ∈ S with k ≥ 0. We then define the notion of a system. This amounts to adding agents f i that act (choose actions in A) in each current possible world.
1. (S, F, G) is a system frame as defined above.
Every
Agents are partial functions on the set of structure-ended (S, A, I)-sequences. Intuitively, an agent makes choices in models of S based on the current model B k and also the (S, A, I)-sequence that gave rise to that model. If an agent is undefined on some entry, this can perhaps most naturally be interpreted so that the entry is irrelevant for the underlying study, 5 to give one option.
If an agent f i gets permanently removed from the system for some reason, then it can still be technically desirable to keep f i defined on sequences that extend further to the future in order to enable longer and longer evolutions to be free of entries where functions have no defined value. 6 The removed agent can, for example, systematically output some special non-action symbol (say, d ∈ A). Similar considerations can concern agents that have not yet entered the system, or have temporarily left the system. These can be associated with different symbols (say, u ∈ A and t ∈ A). An agent who is present, but chooses not to act, would output some yet another non-action symbol. Using special outputs for non-actions has the benefit that we can indeed distinguish reasons why the agent is inactive.
It is at this stage quite clear that together with G, the agents f j make systems evolve within the constraints given by F . The agents act in a possible world B i , and then F determines, based on the actions, a set W of potential new possible worlds. The actual new possible world is then chosen from W by G. 5 The same interpretation for the cases where F or G is undefined is also important. Indeed, one reason for allowing F , G and each fi to be partial functions is to enable finite (or otherwise limited) systems to be defined. 6 Some crucial action tuple ai = (fj (ti))j∈I (where ti is a structure-ended (S, A, I)sequence) can then have all its entries defined even if some agents j ∈ I are not present in the last world of ti.
The set of finite evolutions of a system (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ) is the set that contains all structure-ended (S, A, I)-sequences
such that B 0 = G((ǫ, F (ǫ))) and the following conditions hold for each i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1:
Also the empty sequence is a finite evolution. Infinite evolutions are defined in the analogous way to be infinite sequences (B 0 , a 0 , B 1 , a 1 , . . . ) of the ordinal length ω and satisfying the above conditions 1 and 2 with B 0 = G((ǫ, F (ǫ))).
If B = (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ) is a system and E a structure-ended (S, A, I)sequence, then (B, E) is called an instance. If E is also a finite evolution of the system, we may call (B, E) a realizable instance. An instance (realizable or not) can also be called a pointed system in analogy with pointed models in modal logic. The last structure B k of E is called the current structure or current world of (B, E) (and also of E). The set S of B = (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ) is called the domain or universe of B (and also the domain of the system frame base (S, F ) and system frame (S, F, G)).
Systems (and frames and frame bases) where all functions are total are called strongly regular. We below analyse systems, and occasionally ignore technically anomalous features arising in systems that are not strongly regular.
On interpretations of systems
While there are numerous natural interpretations of systems as defined here, the following rather ambitious interpretation stands out. A system frame base (S, F ) of a system (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ) can be interpreted to represent the material or physical part of the system, while G and the functions f i are the non-physical or non-material part. The functions f i can indeed be considered to be individual agents, 7 while G can be regarded as some kind of a high 7 The functions fi encode behaviour strategies of agents and the indices in I can be thought to provide agent names or something of that sort, a unique name (or index) for each agent. If desired, it is of course possible to construct a physical counterpart (a body) for an agent and encode it into the structures in S. The body need not necessarily be a connected or somehow local pattern. One natural choice is to pick a new relation symbol Ri for each agent index i ∈ I to represent the body. But that is just one choice. The related function fi can in suitable cases be modeled by letting some part of the encoding external controller-or perhaps chance or luck -that determines the ultimate evolutive behaviour of the system. The agents pick actions from the set A, and based on the actions, F determines a set of new possible worlds. The actual new world is then picked by G from that set. It is natural to consider F to correspond to physical constraints within which the evolution happens, while G is a more abstract (perhaps intuitively non-physical), chance-like entity. 8 Within the collection of various interpretations, it is highly natural to consider systems where the tuples a i of agents' choices are determined by the current structure B i , as opposed to entire sequence (B 0 , a 0 , . . . , B i−1 , a i−1 , B i ) ending with B i . This of course implies that for each j ∈ I, there exists a function h j such that
holds for every i. Note that for each structure B i ∈ S, the function f j must be defined either on every structure-ended sequence ending with B i or none of such structure-ended sequences. 9 Thus the domain of h j is precisely the structures B i such that f j is defined on sequences ending with B i . This reflects the idea that evolution histories-at least up to the extent that the agents can see them-must be encoded in the current structure, if anywhere. The current structure could naturally represent, e.g., the physical world at the current time instance, and the agents' behaviour would then be assumed to depend only on the current physical world. Indeeed, even the full sequence (B 0 , a 0 , . . . , B i−1 , a i−1 ) can be partially (or even fully, within suitable situations) encoded into the current world B i of the extended sequence
(or body) of the agent encode, e.g., a Turing machine, possibly with some fault tolerance included. The input to fi need not be encoded anywhere necessarily. But if it is, then it is most naturally encoded by some small, distinguished part of the current structure, suitably local to the body. This means that fi does not truly necessarily depend on the full sequence ending with the current structure. Instead fi depends only on a crude representation of the actual input. We will discuss these issues in a bit more detail below. 8 It is worth noting that interpretations of systems and the related metaphysical issues do not necessarily have to be taken in some overtly literal sense. Interpretations can also be flexible frameworks that guide thinking in intuitive and fruitful ways. Moreover, it is worth remembering that systems also model various frameworks that can appear rather concrete and even mundane, such as concrete games, simple physical systems, computations, et cetera. Nevertheless, the more literal interpretation attempts are important as they relate to quite fundamental issues. 9 This is because the outputs of fj are determined by the last structure of each input sequence. Thus also a possible lack of an output is taken to be so determined.
Obviously, different agents f j can be made to see (i.e., depend on) different (typically rather small) parts of that encoding. 10 Also F can be made dependent upon the last structure only. This is perhaps natural when F is interpreted to be the part of the physical nature that is not dependent upon chance. Then it may be natural that all such past time events that are considered to affect F , should be readable (and thus encoded into) the current structure.
In contrast to f j and F , it is typically most natural (but of course optional) to keep the behaviour of G dependent on full input tuples (which are of type ((B 0 , a 0 , . . . , B i , a i ), W ) for G). This is natural if G is interpreted to be some kind of a pure luck factor or something similar, a high external force or so on. Then it can be reasonable that the output of G is not readable from the concrete current physical world but can be arbitrary, which in this case means simply dependence upon the full history of structures and choices (and the set W ). 11 
Eliminating features
It is worth noting that for conceptual reasons, it is nice to have both F and G in systems, although the combined action of F and G is essentially a single partial function. We could define systems differently, of course. It is also worth noting that history features can often be relatively naturally simulated in current structures by using suitable encodings. This bears a resemblance to, e.g., defining tree unravelings in temporal logic, where each node then fully determines the history of that node. Furthermore, we can make some of the functions F , G and f j concrete (or perhaps physical) in the sense that some or all of their features get encoded in the structures B i . Indeed, we already mentioned this possibility in relation to agent functions. For example, we can indeed encode Turing machines into the structures in system domains. The Turing machines are then required to fully indicate how the concretized functions would operate. 10 Naturally agents can also have a limited picture of the current world Bi. This issue will be discussed more later on below. 11 The article [13] defines systems according to the intuition that indeed only G depends on full sequences. We note here that there is an obvious typo in [13] . There we should have 1. ai = (fj (Bi))j∈I 2. Bi+1 = G (B0, a0, . . . , Bi, ai) , while the typo version has the first line ai = (fi(Bi))i∈I, which is obviously wrong.
Let (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ) be a system and h ∈ {f i } i∈I a concretized function. Suppose that each structure in S encodes h using some distinguished relation symbols R h,j . For simplicity, suppose h always depends only on the current structure instead of the full history. Now, the relations R h,j are required to "output" the same choices in each sequence ending with B as what h would output with the input B. Of course it is natural to make h depend only on some small part of B, a part that could be encoded close to where the relations R h,j have tuples. Closeness here can be measured in relation to some binary distance relation R. This makes the facts R h,j (b 1 , . . . , b l ) (here b 1 , . . . , b l are elements of B) correspond to the material body of the agent h. Note that while we assumed h depends only on current structures, we could encode history features into structures for h to see.
Suppose we encode a concretized agent function h into the model domains, and suppose we also somehow encode the body of the related agent. It is then natural (but of course not necessary) to let the body of the related agent contain the tuples encoding h. It is also natural (but not necessary) to make the body local, as discussed above. When considering encodings, it is worth noting that tuples of relations (in standard first-order models) do not have a clear identity that carries from a model to another. Indeed, if we have a relation with two tuples, and the model changes so that in the new model we again have two tuples but now somewhere else in the model, then there is no obvious way of telling which new tuple corresponds to which old tuple-if there is any intended correspondence in the first place. If we wish to encode identities for tuples (in first-order models), one idea is to use ternary relations to encode binary relations, with the first coordinate providing an indentity for the tuple. For example, a fact R(b 1 , b 2 , b 3 ) would correspond to a tuple encoding the pair (b 2 , b 3 ) and having b 1 as its indentity.
As we have noted, perceiving only a part of the current model is natural for agents, and it is natural if the perceived part is in the vicinity of the material body of the agent. Next we discuss issues related to perception, and beyond.
Partial and false information
Generally agents make their choices based on sequences
In other words, the functions f j are functions of such sequences. The setting where all agents f j depend on the current structure B k only (i.e., the last structure of the input sequence) will be below referred to as the positional scenario. The general setting is refferred to as the general scenario.
In the general scenario, it is natural that agents f j do not use the full sequence
leading to the current structure B k , but instead some representation of that full sequence. Similarly, in the positional scenarion, it is natural to assume that the agents only see some representation of B k .
In both scenarios, the representation may not necessarily resemble the represented sequence/structure at all, but could instead be partially or even wholly different. The intuition of the representation is that it is the mental model the agent has about reality. Let us make this precise.
We first consider the positional scenario. Fix a system (S, F, G, (f i ) i∈I ).
While the functions f i can indeed depend on all of the current model B k , which can be quite reasonable when modeling perfect information games, it is highly natural to define perception functions to cover the scenario of partial and even false information. Perception functions will make the agent functions f i depend upon perceived models or mental models. We let a perception function for agent i to be a map p i : S → S i , where S i is a class of structures whose signature may be different from those in S. The class S i is the class of mental models of agent i. We then dictate that
and A is simply the set of actions of the system we are considering.
For a concrete example, p i could be a first-order reduction, more or less in the sense of model theory or descriptive complexity, giving a very crude, finite approximation of the original model (which is the input to p i ). 12 Now, even if the input model to p i is infinite, the output model can be finite and depend only on some small part of the input model. 13 Note that parts of the agents' epistemic states can be encoded into the original models in S. Thus the agents can try to take into account those parts of the other agents' epistemic states that they believe to have access to. How much agent i knows about the other agents' epistemic states in B ∈ S will be reflected in the structure of the mental model p i (B). 14 But of course this information can be highly partial, even false, and obviously each agent tends to see different 12 Here the output of pi approximates the current model. We note that it is often sensible to let each output of pi be intended to approximate the current instance (B, E), or even more, with nested beliefs, intentions of agents, and so on. 13 That part could indeed quite naturally be mostly in the vicinity of the encoded body of the agent. 14 The mental model can reflect the agent's beliefs about the other agents' mental states, and the agent's beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, and so on, possibly in a way that includes all agent-mixed nested modalities. But, of course, a mental model does not have to try to do too much. Concerning modalites about nested beliefs, it is typically unrealistic to have everything in the mental model. Indeed, concerning information in general, it is very much realistic to have somehow strongly partial (and perhaps false) information in the mental model. This relates directly to, e.g., limited memory capacities as well as limited perception.
parts of information of the other agents' epistemic states. Of course agents do not even have to know the full set of agents operating in the framework.
The case in the general scenario is very similar and analogous to the positional scenario. Many conceptual issues are more or less the same to a large extent. The difference in the formalism is that now p i maps from the set of structure-ended sequences of the original system into the set S i of mental models of the agent i. The mental model can, in both the general and positional setting, encode how much the agent i remembers and understands about the sequence that has lead to the current model in S. In the general scenario, however, the mental model that p i outputs indeed formally depends on full input sequences, while in the positional scenario, the sequence leading to the current model is available only to the (possibly nonexisting) extent that the sequence is encoded in the current model. Different agents i can of course have different sets S i . But, in general, what should the mental models in the sets S i look like? One option is that they encode sets of models in S. Such a set corresponds to the models in S that the agent considers possible. 15 This is a very classical approach. It is completely unrealistic in many scenarios, as the agent would simply have too much information. Furthermore, it requires that all the models that the agent consider possible are actually models in S.
A somewhat more realistic scenario goes as follows. A mental model in S i is simply a set A of axioms in some logic. Intuitively, it axiomatizes what the actual current model (and the history leading to it) should look like. It can also describe what the full global system (including possible futures, the other agents and their mental models, the location of the current model, et cetera) looks like. 16 We here concentrate mainly on how well the current model is known. The set A could now contain the following.
1.
A set F of facts. 17 These are atoms R(b 1 , . . . , b k ). The elements b 1 , . . . , b k are taken from some set B ′ (which does not have to be the domain of any model in S). Intuitively, the agent could regard b 1 , . . . , b k to be domain elements of the actual current model (which formally is the model B such that p i (B) = A). The relation symbol R can intuitively belong to the signature of the models in S i . Thus R(b 1 , . . . , b k ) could be for example the fact TallerThan(John, Jack) representing 15 A related possibility would be to let a mental model encode a full set of instances (B, E) the agent considers possible. 16 The picture of reality is indeed typically highly partial. 17 We note that facts do not have to be true in any sense. Perhaps atoms would be a better term, or assumptions. the agent's belief that John is taller than Jack in the current actual model 18 B.
The relation R can be something the agent considers to somehow be an actual relation in B, but R can also be some relation internal to the thinking of the agent. In that case also the elements b 1 , . . . , b k can perhaps represent something that the agent does not consider belonging to B. Indeed, such a virtual or purely mental category of facts can be very important. It could be desirable to include, e.g., beliefs about other agents' beliefs into mental models. This will involve encoding related issues into facts in F.
2.
A set F ′ of negative facts. These are fully analogous to facts in F, but represent beliefs that the agent thinks false. Formally, these are literals
Note that there is no problem if the agent holds a fact in F and its negation in F ′ . Then the agent simply has contradictory beliefs. It may be difficult for the agent to detect the contradiction.
3.
A set B of other axioms. 19 These are, in the most obvious cases, statements that the agent thinks the actual current model satisfies. They could also be statements about more abstract issues that are not (necessarily) directly related to the current model, for example statements about the beliefs of other agents. The only difference between these and the facts and negative facts in F ∪F ′ is that these need not be literals. These non-literals can still, of course, make use of the elements in B ′ , if desired. Again the agent can have contradictory beliefs, as some subset of B can have a contradiction as a logical consequence. It could simply be difficult for the agent to deduce that contradiction. Or even, it is possible that the agent later on does easily deduce that contradiction, but at this stage of evolution, the agent has not yet been able to obtain the contradiction. Such a situation occurs even in mathematical proofs; we typically do not immediately obtain a contradiction, but it takes some effort.
To give an example of the above scenario, let the system domain S consist of first-order models. Let the set B ′ be the union of the domains of the models in S. Suppose the current model B ∈ S consists of a domain {a, b} and a relation R = {(a, a), (a, b)}. Let the mental model p i (B) be given by
We are here discussing a scenario where the mental model simply tries to identify B to the best possible extent. The agent knows that R(a, a) and ¬R(b, a) as well as ¬∃ ≥8 x(x = x) hold, but the agent has no idea about whether-for example-the fact R(b, b) holds or whether there are more than two elements. The agent knows, we suppose in this scenario, that the actual model is one of the models in the set of {R}-models that satisfy F ∪ F ′ ∪ B and have domain D such that {a, b} ⊆ D ⊆ B ′ . 20 Thus the setting resembles open world querying. Now, to fully know the model B, the mental model could be given by
Note that here we give the full relational diagram of B and specify that there are no more elements than those mentioned in the diagram. This suffices to fully specify the model in this case. 21
Now, the agent i must choose an action based on the mental model p i (B). This is done via a function d i : S i → A that maps mental models to actions in A. Now, a typical agent has limited reasoning resources, not being logically omniscient. Indeed, as we have discussed, it could even in some cases be difficult for the agent to deduce a contradiction from a fact in F and its negation in F ′ . This is even typical if F and F ′ are large (physical) look-up tables. And deducing a contradiction from a contradictory set B is likewise not always straightforward.
One natural way to model d i is to use the limited reasoning capacities described in [11] . The idea is that the agent uses logical reasoning, but has 20 If M is an {R}-model and has a and b as domain elements, then we define that
already implies that there must be two elements at least (a and b are different elements), and note indeed that we do not even interpret these formulae on models without a and b in the domain. Of course one could avoid all this, if desired, and work only with the usual conventions concerning constant symbols.) 21 Here we did not include atoms a = a in the diagram, but of course one would generally have to include them to always be able to tell what the domain is when looking at the full diagram. When diagrams indeed mean sets of literals where the constants in the literals are domain elements, we can specify models fully with suitable diagram notions, not only up to isomorphism, if we so wish for one reason or another. But there is nothing technically deep behind this, and different conventions are possible for different ways of modeling.
access only to a possibly too small collection of inference rules and may also have to truncate reasoning patterns after quite short reasoning chains. The premises consist of the set F ∪ F ′ ∪ B. It is natural for example to impose a fixed limit n dictating how many times the agent is allowed to use the inference rules. Also, it is natural to put similar limitations onto the set of formulae the agent can know at any time. So, if the agent reasons starting from F ∪ F ′ ∪ B, the agent cannot add new formulae into the setting without a limit when reasoning. The agent may have to throw some formulae away during the reasoning process. While this mainly models finite memory capacities, note, however, that of course the agent could use external look-up tables to store information. But those could, on the other hand, become large and slow to read. Anyway, in an ideal case, the agent can deduce the full structure of the current model B based on the mental model, and perhaps even the full history leading to B, and beyond, all the way to the global features of the system. If the agent i can always deduce the full history, then f i can depend on full histories.
It is obviously dependent upon the agent (and even the current instance) what reasoning tools can be used, and how complex reasoning patterns are allowed. Concerning reasoning tools, it is reasonable to add inference rules to the set F ∪ F ′ ∪ B. An additional set I could be used. There should be ways to modify the set I based on the current world and the history. Such ways can be encoded into the function p i that produces the mental models. A later mental model is typically dependent upon an earlier one, e.g., p i (B j+1 ) upon and p i (B j ); this dependence could be mediated via the actual world B j+1 .
Of course one does not have to use standard logic to model truncated and limited reasoning, but also, e.g., complexity classes and computation devices with suitably limited capacities. The mental models above are a starting point, but of course one would like to add more general features to the picture. For example, probabilistic and fuzzy features (e.g., probabilistic weights on the literals and even general axioms) are surely interesting. And obviously probability theory is not likely to suffice, but generalizations are needed. Other approaches that also immediately suggest themselves include using neural networks and other frameworks that involve possibilities for heuristic reasoning. The obvious places where to use neural networks concern the perception and decision functions p i and d i . A neural network device would be a natural option for producing the outputs of p i . It would look at some small part of the current model (and perhaps its history) and operate based on that. Also d i could quite naturally be computed, based the mental model, via a neural network device. We could even remove the mental model from between p i and d i altogether, if desired. However, concerning human agents, it would ultimately perhaps be more informative to combine the use of neural networks with more classical features.
It is worth noting that in our concrete example of a mental model, the set F ∪ F ′ approximated a first-order model. But human agents more typically entertain picture-like representations of models, that is, drawings of structures rather than the structures themselves. It can be difficult to detect, e.g., graph isomorphism. To account for more geometric mental models, we could modify the F ∪ F ′ ∪ B approach a bit. The idea is to add three-dimensional grids to the setting. Let G 1 , . . . , G ℓ be such grids. 22 We let each grid have a finite (but perhaps large) domain and thus correspond to a finite set of points forming a rectangular cuboid array. Now, we identify each (or alternatively, some) of the elements b ∈ B ′ appearing in the literals of F ∪ F ′ with some grid point. If there are elements in the formulae of B that do not occur in the literals, then those elements can also be identified with grid points. It is natural (but not necessary) to require that each literal has its elements in a single grid. Now the patterns described via F ∪ F ′ have become geometric objects (we draw the tuples into the grids in the obvious way). We have drawings in three dimensions (and these could be made two dimensional as well). The reason we have started with several rather than a single grid is that typically an agent entertains a collection of mental images rather than a single one.
It is interesting to note that while F ∪ F ′ corresponds to knowledge, B in some sense relates to understanding, or at least more abstract knowledge. We could add a set C to F ∪F ′ ∪B, this being a set of suitably encoded reasoning algorithms that the agent could then use on the formulae in F ∪ F ′ ∪ B and their more or less immediate logical consequences. C could contain at least some proof rules (as the set I discussed above did). Now C would relate quite nicely to understanding and the look-up-table-like set F ∪ F ′ to knowledge. Of course somehow truncated reasoning, not full logical consequence, would be natural. Indeed, full logical consequence seems to relate to potential knowability rather than knowledge.
Summarizing this section so far, we have identified ways to model partial information and even false information via mental models given by p i . A partially false and strongly incomplete picture is a reasonably natural starting point for modeling attempts. We have also discussed how d i could take into account limitations in reasoning capacities. There are many ways to do this, and obviously a huge range of issues to investigate.
So far we have concentrated on the positional scenario. In the general scenario, however, the functions p i and d i are very much conceptually analogous to their counterparts in the positional scenario, so the above investigations also largely apply conceptually in the general setting. Formally, the domain of p i is the set of structure-ended (S, A, I)-sequences and the output is a mental model. It is perhaps most natural to make the domain of d i simply the set of mental models, as in the positional scenario. Indeed, even in the positional scenario, some parts of histories would often become encoded in the mental models, as there can be history features encoded in a current structure. However, it can also be reasonable to, e.g., let d i depend on the chain of mental models leading to the current one, and the agent's own action in every past iteration step.
Further issues
Systems can be used to model games, computation and physics systems, to name a few possibilities. Indeed, all kinds of interactive scenarios are reasonably naturally modeled by systems. Concerning applications in physics systems, the advantage of our formal systems is the possibility of concretely modeling supposed mental entities (agents and G) together with the supposably physical part (structures and F ). 23
Cellular automata provide a starting point for digital physics, but systems, as defined above, are much more flexible. 24 The metaphysical setting of systems provides a lot of explanatory power for understanding phenomena. 25 The way the supposedly mental constructs (G and each f i ) interact with the material parts is highly interesting. As systems are fully formal, concrete modeling attempts will force new concepts and insights to emerge.
One of the most concrete and obvious advantages of systems when compared to, e.g., standard cellular automata, is that it is not necessary to keep agents (and other entities) local. Furthermore, it is not necessary (although can be natural) to keep agents and other entities computable. However, computability and semi-computatbility are obviously very important issues. As 23 We note that the division "agents and G" vs "structures and F " does not necessarily provide a strict gap between what would be conceived as mental and what physical. Indeed, of course the supposed mental and physical realms are likely to show some connection between them to enable interaction between the realms. The agents realistically have perception functions pi via which they see the structures in the system domain. And the function F looks at the actions of the agents and provides an output partially based on that. However, we coud assert, e.g., that F only sees the actions once they have been performed, making F fully material in some sense. 24 Of course one of the most obvious ideas is to make functions computable or semicomputable. But it is interesting to keep also more general functions in the picture, for example it could be quite natural to let G be uncomputable. And it is often natural to let F output infinite sets. 25 Indeed, it is natural to regard systems as a framework providing a formal metaphysical setting for modeling seemingly less fundamental frameworks with more contingent properties, such as particular physical processes, for instance. suggested in [9] , extensions of the Turing-complete logic L can be naturally used as logics to guide systems. We will discuss this issue below in Section 4.
More general systems
Our notion of a system can of course be generalized. Indeed, currently every current structure has a finite history leading to it. To allow for infinite past evolutions, and to get rid of the discreteness of the steps between subsequent models, we define the following notion.
A total g-system (g for general 26 ) is defined to be a tuple
such that the following conditions hold.
1. S is a set of structures.
2. Each R j ⊆ S k j is a k j -ary relation over S. Intuitively, R j could for example give a partial order of the structures in S that corresponds to time. But of course other interpretations are possible.
3. F is a function P(S) × A I → P(P(S)). Intuitively, F maps each history (a set of structures in S) to a set of extended evolutions (a collection of subsets of S). The output depends also on the actions of the agents.
4. Each f i is a function P(S) → A from histories to actions.
5.
G is a function P(S) × A I → P(S) such that G(t) ∈ F (t) for each input where F (t) = ∅. If F (t) = ∅, then G(t) = ∅. Intuitively, G just picks the actual outcome from the set of possible outcomes given by F . 27
This is a relatively general approach. For example, it is possible to cover cyclic approaches to time, even dense ones, for example by mapping S into R 2 . And of course one can consider approaches with no time concept in the first place.
A basic notion in total g-systems is a set of structures. The principal intuition of such a set is a history of some kind. Note that histories do not this time contain actions, so single action tuples in A I are perhaps most naturally continuous processes acting all the way through the input (a history). But of course actions could be embedded into histories in a different way, leading to generalizations. Another one of the reasonable further generalizations is to base actions on sets of histories instead of a single one. This leads to systems (P(S), (R j ) j∈J , F, (f i ) i∈I , G) with the following specification. 28
2. Each R j ⊆ S k j is still simply a k j -ary relation over S.
3. F is a function P(P(S)) × A I → P(P(P(S))).
4. Each f i is a function P(P(S)) → A.
Further generalizations would involve, e.g., putting weights on structure sets and sets of structure sets. And so on and so on.
A highly general setting to model nested beliefs can be based on the concurrent game models of Alternating-time temporal logic. Consider the reasonably flexible concurrent game models as defined in, inter alia, [4] . These can be given canonical tree unravelings; we begin from a single state and unravel from there. This gives an unraveled model with a root. We let T be a set of such unravelings. One of the unravelings could be what is actually happening, but we will also model (possibly false and even unrealizable) beliefs about time flow.
Now, each state of T has a unique history. (Recall that a state is now a copy of a state in some original model, but also with a unique history.) Given the set of agents is K, suppose there is, for each k ∈ K, a binary relation R k ⊆ Q × Q, where Q is the set of states of T . Intuitively, (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ R k if in the state q 1 , the agent k considers it possible that (s)he is currently in state q 2 . So these are epistemic relations, and they can point from one unraveling to another. The nice thing here is that the states have a unique history, so the binary relations are also binary epistemic relations over the set of histories. And each history has a sequence of changing beliefs about the current history, et cetera. Now we can analyse interesting nested beliefs that also involve temporal statemens. Suppose k is at q a and R k points only to q b from q a . Now k believes to be at q b . Suppose the predecessor of q b is q c . Now k thinks the previous state was q c . Now suppose q c is also the predecessor of q a . Then k is right about the previous state but for a wrong reason. 29
Here we did not nest the beliefs of different agents, k and l for example. But that is of course possible, leading to beliefs about beliefs with a temporal dimension, and so on and so on. All this is nice and quite general. The mental model of k at q could be considered to be the set of pairs (T , q ′ ) such that (q, q ′ ) ∈ R k . 30 However, in the current article we are very much interested in using (what would be) the internal structure of states. In T , the states do not have an internal structure. 31 The setting of T uses epistemic relations that in a sense seem blind to the possible internal structures of states. Nevertheless, both the internal view and the external one can be useful, and surely the approaches can be combined. Indeed, states of T might as well be (replaced by) relational structures, and conversely, our structure-based setting with systems and mental models does suggest global epistemic relations for agents.
In T and also generally in Kripke models, it is interesting to define a metaphysical (rather than epistemic) relation S k for agents k. As R k , this is also a binary relation on states of T (or some other Kripke model). Now, using the relations S k and R k , it is at least relatively natural to define the standard indicative implication "ϕ implies ψ" as [R k ](ϕ → ψ) and the subjunctive implication "if ϕ was the case, then so would ψ" as [S k ](ϕ → ψ). Here [R k ] and [S k ] are boxes with the accessibility relations R k and S k , and ϕ and ψ are formulae whose truth sets are sets of states. The metaphysical modalities S k are likely to be similar or even the same for all agents. Typically they would be equivalence relations, but not necessarily always. Finally, it is worth noting that two states can naturally be coupled with an indistinguishability relation of agent k if k sees precisely the same states from the two states via the epistemic relation R k .
Systems and logic
The article [7] defines a natural Turing-complete extension L of first-order logic FO. This new logic is Turing-complete in the sense that it can define 29 All kinds of questions rise about the setting, the epistemic relations, and so on. For example, one would typically-but perhaps not always-require the epistemic relations to be transitive. But, we shall not discuss this setting in depth here. 30 If we want to remember the original models that gave rise to the unravelings, we get an interesting static-sameness relation over the set of states of T defined such that q and q ′ are related if the last state in q and q ′ is the same state (and originates from the same model). Note that q and q ′ are indeed sequences formally. 31 They have no internal structure unless we look into the sequences (in the original models) that define the states in T when we unravel models. But we do not mean to look into them here (with the exception of defining the static-sameness relations). precisely all recursively enumerable classes of finite structures. The logic is based on adding two new capacities to FO. The first one of these is the capacity to modify models. The logic can add new points to models and new tuples to relations, and dually, the logic can delete domain points and tuples from relations. 32 The second new capacity is the possibility of formulae to refer to themselves. The self-referentiality operator of L is based on a construct that enables looping when formulae are evaluated using gametheoretic semantics. 33
The reason the logic L is particularly interesting lies in its simplicity and its exact behavioural correspondence with Turing machines. Furthermore, it provides a natural and particularly simple unified perspective on logic and computation. Also, the new operators of L directly capture two fundamental classes of constructors-missing from FO-that are used all the time in everyday mathematics:
1. fresh points are added to constructions and fresh lines are drawn, et cetera, in various contexts in, e.g., geometry, and 2. recursive operators are omnipresent in mathematical practice, often indicated using the three dots (...).
One of the advantageous properties of L (in relation to typical logics) is that it can indeed modify models. And models surely do not have be static, althought that is still the typical approach. Even in classical mathematics, we modify our structures. For example in compass-and-straightedge constructions, we draw new points and lines. While there exist logics that modify structures (e.g., sabotage modal logic, some public announcement logics, et cetera), L offers a fundamental framework for modifications. 32 Strictly speaking, the system defined in [7] did not include the capacity to delete points from model domains. However, this possibility was briefly discussed, and it was then ruled out only due to page limitations in the paper. The reason for leaving out the capacity to delete domain points was mainly related to the fact that this can lead to variables x whose referent has gone missing from the model domain. Also empty models appear. However, in the current article we let L refer to the logic that also has the domain element deletion operator (and the empty model is fine). Furthermore, [7] made the some other limitations to the syntax of L so that a semantic game does not lead to anomalous situations where again x has no value (even if there are no domain element deletions). Such situations were described to result in from non-standard jumps. Here we impose no limitations on the syntax. Basically the result of these relaxations is simply more situations where neither player has a winning strategy in the game. Also, domain element deletion is crucial in various scenarios that allow all computable model transformations to be modeled directly.
33 See [7] for sufficient details on game-theoretic semantics, and see [5] , [15] for some early ideas leading to the notion of game-theoretic semantics.
The syntax and semantics of L
Here we give the syntax and semantics of L. For the full formal details, see [7] . We let L denote the language that extends the syntax specification of first-order logic by the following formula construction rules:
We also allow allow atoms X(x 1 , . . . , x k ) where X ∈ tsymb is a kary relation symbol not in the signature considered. The set tsymb contains a countably infinite set of symbols for each positive integer arity. 34
Intuitively, a formula of type Ix ϕ(x) states that it is possible to insert a fresh, isolated element u to the domain of the current model so that the resulting new model satisfies ϕ(u). The fresh element u being isolated means that u is disconnected from the original model; the relations of the original model are not altered in any way by the operator Ix, so u does not become part of any relational tuple at the moment of insertion. (Note that we assume a purely relational signature for the sake of simplicity.)
A formula of type I R(x 1 ,...,xn) ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) states that it is possible to insert a tuple (u 1 , . . . , u n ) to the relation R so that ϕ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) holds in the obtained model. The tuple (u 1 , . . . , u n ) is a sequence of elements in the original model, so this time the domain of the model is not altered. Instead, the n-ary relation R obtains a new tuple. The deletion operators Dx and D R(x 1 ,...,xn) have obvious dual intuitions to the insertion operators.
The new atomic formulae C i can be regarded as variables ranging over formulae, so a formula C i can be considered to be a pointer to (or the name of) some other formula. The formulae C i ϕ could intuitively be given the 34 The name tsymb comes from the fact that these symbols are analogous to Turing machine tape symbols, i.e., symbols not part of the input language. It is conjectured in [7] that the symbols in tsymb are not needed for Turing-completeness of L, unless the background signature contains no symbols of arity at least two. The R in the operators I R(x 1 ,...xn) and D R(x 1 ,...xn) can be a relation symbol in the signature or a symbol in tsymb.
following reading: the claim C i , which states that ϕ, holds. Thus the formula C i ϕ is both naming ϕ to be called C i and claming that ϕ holds. 35 Importantly, the formula ϕ can contain C i as an atomic formula. This leads to self-reference. For example, the liar's paradox now corresponds to the formula C i ¬ C i . .
The logic L is based on game-theoretic semantics GTS which directly extends the standard GTS of FO. Recall that the GTS of FO is based on games played by the verifier and falsifier, or more accurately, between Eloise and Abelard, Eloise first holding the verifying role (which can change if a negation is encountered). In a game for checking if M |= ϕ, Eloise is trying to show (or verify) that indeed M |= ϕ and Abelard is opposing this, i.e., Abelard wishes to falsify the claim M |= ϕ. The players start from the original formula and work their way towards subformulae and ultimately atoms. See [7] for further details concerning the GTS of FO and also L.
We now discuss how the rules for the FO-game are extended to deal with L. Further details are indeed given in [7] . Each game position involves a model -assignment pair (M, f ) and a formula ψ. The point of the assignment f is to give interpretations to the free variable symbols of ψ in the domain of M. A game position also specifies which one of Eloise and Abelard is the verifying player. Furthermore, there is an assignment that gives interpretations of the relations X not in the signature. In the beginning of the game play, the relations X are all empty relations, so they must be built by adding tuples during the game play. For simplicity, we do not explicitly write down this assignment for relations X below, but instead assume it is somehow encoded into the models involved. 36 The game rules go as follows. 35 It is worth noting that the approach in L to formulae Ci ϕ bears some degree of purely technical similarity to evaluations of fixed-point operators of the µ-calculus via game-theoretic semantics. However, that approach to fixed-point operators has not-to the author's knowledge-been connected to self-referentiality and the related concepts in any way. Indeed, the approach of L is-to the author's knowledge-conceptually novel, and has game-theoretic semantics as an underlying primitive starting point. Furthermore, the approach in L is fully general and not explicitly related to any fixed-point concepts. For example, there are no monotonicity restrictions imposed on formulae, unlike in the µ-calculus for example. Another thing worth noting here is that [7] simply uses numbers as formula variables (which here are symbols Ci). . , x n → u n ]) and ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) where M ′ is obtained from M by deleting the tuple (u 1 , . . . , u n ) from the relation R. If there is no such tuple in R, then the relation stays as it is. As above, we note that R can be in the signature or one of the relations X outside the signature.
5.
In a position involving (M, f ) and C i ψ, we simply move to the position involving (M, f ) and ψ.
6. In an atomic position involving (M, f ) and C i , the game moves to the position (M, C i ψ). Here C i ψ is a subformula of the original formula that the semantic game began with. If there are many such subformulae C i ψ, the verifying player can freely jump to any of them. If there are no such formulae, the game play ends with neither player winning. 37 7. In a position with (M, f ) and an atom of type R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) or x = y, the game play ends. We denote the atom by ψ and note that R can once again be in the signature or one of the symbols X. Since the play of the game can end only if an atom R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) or x = y is encountered, the game play can go on forever, as for example the games for C i C i and C i ¬ C i demonstrate. If a play indeed goes on forever, then that play is won by neither of the players.
Turing-machines exhibit precisely the kind of behaviour captured by L, as they can 1. halt in an accepting state (corresponding to Eloise-who is initially the verifier-winning the semantic game play), 2. halt in a rejecting state (corresponding to Abelard-who is the initial falsifier-winning), 3 . diverge (corresponding to neither of the players winning).
Indeed, there is a precise correspondence between L and Turing machines. Let M |= + ϕ (respectively, M |= − ϕ) denote that Eloise (respectively, Abelard) has a winning strategy in the game beginning with M and ϕ. Let enc(M) denote the encoding of the finite model M according to some standard encoding scheme. 39 Then the following theorem shows that L corresponds to Turing machines so that not only acceptance and rejection but even divergence of Turing computation is captured in a precise and natural way. The proof follows from [7] . In the theorem, by a Turing machine for a structure problem, we mean a Turing machine TM that gives an equivalent treatment to isomorphic inputs: for isomorphic M and N, TM either accepts both enc(M) and enc(N); rejects both; or diverges on both inputs. Vice versa, for every ϕ ∈ L, there is a TM such that the above two conditions hold.
Technically this is a result in descriptive complexity theory showing that L captures the complexity class RE (recursive enumerability). While the result concerns finite models, it is possible to extend the result to deal with arbitrary models. The idea is to extend Turing machines to suitable hypercomputation models while allowing iteration in L to repeat for ω rounds and beyond.
Since L captures RE, it cannot be closed under negation. Thus ¬ is not the classical negation. However, L has a very natural translation into natural language. The key is to replace truth by verification. We read M |= + ϕ as the claim that "it is verifiable that T (ϕ)" where T is the translation from L into natural language defined below. We give two ways to translate atoms x = y and R(x 1 , . . . , x n ). The first way (given in clause 1 below) covers the case where in each game position, every first-order variable must get a value assigned to it via the assignment function f . Clause 9 gives a more careful reading for x = y and R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) which covers also the anomalous cases where f may not give values to all variables.
1.
We translate x = y and R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) to themselves, so for example T (x = y) simply reads x equals y.
2. The atoms C i are read as they stand, so T (C i ) = C i .
3. The FO-quantifiers translate in the standard way, so we let T (∃xϕ) = there exists an x such that T (ϕ) and analogously for ∀x.
4. Also ∨ and ∧ translate in the standard way, so T (ϕ∨ψ) = T (ϕ) or T (ψ) and analogously for ∧.
However, T (¬ψ)
= it is falsifiable that T (ψ). Thus negation translates to the dual of verifiability.
Concerning the insertion operators, we let
T (Ix ϕ) = it is possible to insert a new element x such that T (ϕ).
Similarly, we let
it is possible to insert a tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) into R such that T (ϕ).
7.
Deletion operators can also be given similar natural readings.
Finally, we let
T (C i ϕ ) = it is possible to verify the claim C i which states that T (ϕ).
9. We can always give the following alternative and more careful readings to first-order atoms x = y and R(x 1 , . . . , x n ):
(a) T (x = y) states that the referent of x is equal to the referent of y.
(b) T (R(x 1 , . . . , x n )) = the referents of x 1 , . . . , x n form a tuple in R in the given order. 40
Thereby L can be seen as a simple Turing-complete fragment of natural language. Indeed, the simplicity of L is one of its main strengths. Also, as typical computationally motivated logics translate into L more or less directly, L can be used as a natural umbrella logic for studying complexities of logics. This can be advantageous, as the number of different logic formalisms is huge. Thus L offers a natural unified framework for a programme of studying, e.g., validity and satisfiability problems. First-order logic is not a suitable umbrella logic for such a programme, being expressively too weak. The expressivity of L, on the other hand, is of a fundamental nature, due to its Turing-completeness. Furthermore, L offers a top platform for descriptive complexity. Indeed, L can easily capture classes beoynd the class ELEMENTARY, while no k-th order logic can. Again L would serve as a natural, unifying umbrella logic. 41 All in all, L could be used as a unified framework for working on-inter alia-many kinds of reasoning issues (validity, satisfiability) as well as topics relating to expressivity. In the next section we analyse some further conceptual issues concerning L.
Further properties of L
It is interesting to note that ¬ can be read as the classical negation (rather than falsifiability) in those fragments of L where the semantic games are determined. Standard FO is such a fragment. Furthermore, adding a generalized quantifier to L corresponds to adding a corresponding oracle to Turing machines; see [7] for further details.
In our system, under our formal and fully explained semantics, the sentence C i ¬C i is indeterminate, and so is C i C i . This should be natural from any 40 Note that even ending up with an atom x = x (or ¬x = x), without f specifying a value for x, leads to neither player winning the game. This is natural with the given reading for atoms. The formulae can indeed quite naturally be considered indeterminate with respect to verification/falsification when x has no value. 41 We note that RE, as a limit of computation, is indeed a reasonable upper bound for standard descriptive complexity.
perspective that accepts the semantics we gave. To further analyse whether this is natural, let us consider C i C i first. Now, a typical logic (such as FO) is compositional, with well-founded formulae. This means each formula is essentially an algebra term f (t 1 , . . . , t k ). And the formula f (t 1 , . . . , t k ) has a meaning which is determined by applying the function f to the meanings of t 1 , . . . , t k . The well-foundedness means that the algebra term is finite, and ultimately has atomic formulae x 1 , . . . , x k whose meaning is fully determined in some uncontroversial and independent way. Thus we can evaluate f (t 1 , . . . , t k ) in a finite process, since the ultimately reachable atoms have already fully defined, independent meanings. Such logical reductionism is handy indeed.
However, at least in the sense of our semantics, C i C i does not have this kind of a well-founded evaluation process. Syntactically C i C i is an algebraic term (the first C i is an operator and the second one an atom). However, semantically, the meaning of the atom C i is not already defined, but instead, it must be evaluated based on the full formula C i C i (because from the atom C i we jump back to the operator C i and continue checking from there). Therefore the meaning of C i C i is defined based on C i C i itself. Thus it is natural to consider the sentence indeterminate. The same holds for C i ¬C i . It also tries to define its meaning based on itself. It is indeed natural to require meanings to be dug from an external source in a reductionist way: if we define q to be true if and only if q is true, and no further information about the situation can appear, it is natural to consider q indeterminate. Digging up the truth value from the atomic level is impossible in the case of C i C i and C i ¬C i . We note that, if one accepts the semantic game of C i ¬C i to also be the evaluation procedure of the actual liar sentence, then the explained lack of well-foundedness applies as such. This leads to an indeterminate truth value. However, of course, this can be considered paradoxical, as now the statement "this sentence is false" seems false, as the sentence was supposed to be indeterminate. But false is not indeterminate, and so onwards, in the usual way, it seems to get different flipping truth values. 42
As we have discussed above, our formal systems, as defined in Section 3, can be used to model a wide variety of dynamical frameworks rather naturally. Now, it is obvious that the semantic games of the logic L are systems in our formal sense. Thus L can be directly used, inter alia, to model evolving 42 In our system with our reading, Ci¬Ci states roughly that "this sentence is falsifiable." The sentence formally evaluates to indeterminate. Now one could assert that since indeterminacy does not equal falsifiability, we can conclude that the sentence is in fact false (meaning that falsifiability was not the case). Now, "false" here meant "falsifiability was not the case" and indeterminate is therefore consistent with this meaning of false. (Note that we do not have "false" in our system. Simply falsifiable, verifiable and indeterminate. We have dictated a semantics, we do not compare truth values to anything external to the semantics.) physical frameworks. However, L is also a natural setting for formalizing mathematics. Indeed, L can be used as a possible, highly strict measure of what counts as a mathematical claim. Indeed, mathematics is intuitively and informally something fully rigorous and somehow predetermined and objective. It is often considered somehow mind independent and perhaps even of a Platonic nature. Now, can we capture this intuition of strict objectivity?
A nice starting point for capturing the intuition would be to assert that a claim is mathematical if we can determine whether it holds using some uniform systematic procedure. The idea here is that there exists a systematic procedure P with a carefully defined set of inputs and the set {yes, no} of outputs. The (not necessarily nice) requirement here is that the set of inputs I is somehow rigorously fixed and quite limited. A natural option here would be that the set I must be somehow extremely simple (for example the collection of all finite strings over the alphabet {0, 1} or the-suitably simple and certainly decidable-collection of all formulae of some logic; we are thinking about L here).
Another (not necessarily nice) requirement is that we must pick a single systematic procedure P to check, for each input i ∈ I, whether i holds or not. 43 Now, I is precisely the set of mathematical statements, and we have a systematic and somehow objective procedure P for verifying truth 44 of the statements, but P does not have to produce an output on every input, so P could correspond to a Turing machine. Thus it is possible to consider formulae of L to be I. For each input ϕ ∈ L, we check whether ϕ is verified or falsified in the empty model. 45 It is of course possible that ϕ is neither 43 A Turing machine is a systematic procedure. Sometimes Turing machines are described to capture what can be mechanically executed. But "mechanical" is perhaps not as good a word as "systematic." This is because the word "mechanical" has a quite strong connotation relating to physicality. Physical systems can do things that seem more or less impossible to explain/calculate/describe, even in principle. Turing machines are physically realizable in principle, but the converse (from physically realized devices to Turing machines) is problematic. This is because we cannot tell precisely what the full components of an actual, physically realized device are. It can be more or less impossible to somehow write down a precise Turing specification based on the physical construct. For example, in principle, a series of coin tosses could keep giving heads on precisely the rounds j ∈ S ⊆ N, where S is undecidable. Given a physically realized device, perhaps it is essentially a Turing machine, but the problem is that it is hard to know which one. Thus it may be more to the point to make the hypothesis that Turing machines capture the notion of systematic executability rather than mechanical. Nevertheless, it can of course even be natural to make the hypothesis that nature is a essentially a Turing machine, but this does not imply that we understand, simply by looking at physcal systems, what machine that systems should correspond to. This is especially true if we cannot-and it seems we cannot-fully isolate the system from its environment. 44 Indeed, one could claim that P even defines (or can be considered to define) which claims hold. And we will indeed consider the scenario where P determines truth. 45 More rigorously, we consider the empty model in the signature of ϕ.
verified nor falsified. The way the procedure P now works is, for its essential parts, described in [7] , proof of Theorem 4.3. The nice thing is that L is a logic, so our inputs are statements rather than, e.g., binary strings. 46
Now, the setting is still quite restrictive, because L does not directly talk about, e.g., infinite sets. Thus it will not be sensible to equate the setting with real mathematics. But it can be viewed as a possible formulation of the strict core of mathematics. The framework based on L is objective, finitary and captures the notion of systematicity. It indeed fully and formally captures systematicity if we define systematicity according to the Church-Turing thesis to correspond to Turing machines. In a sense, systematicity is also precisely and exactly what logic is all about, so it is possible to entertain the view that L provides a definition of logicality. 47
Note especially that the perspective of using L to define mathematical statements banishes typical incompleteness issues. Every statement ϕ ∈ L corresponds to posing the questions "∅ |= + ϕ ?" and "∅ |= − ϕ ?". The answer is given by P. If ∅ |= + ϕ, then P outputs yes, and if ∅ |= − ϕ, then P outputs no.
If P diverges, 48 then P will not output anything. Indeed, we take P to define truth and falsity here. Thus there are no true but not verifiable (or false but unfalsiable) staments. The system defines truth values, nothing external does. (It is worth noting that the statements where P diverges are simply considered not to have any truth value-unless divergence/indeterminacy is a truth value, which is then the truth value of those sentences.)
In conclusion, L gives a possible, strict standard for strict mathematicity (or logicality, we do not differentiate here). The thesis that logicality equals systematicity can be appealing, and if systematicity equals Turing executability (RE), then L hits some fundamental mark. Thus it could be regarded as a fundamental logic. For those in favour of the perspective that there is a unique fundamental logic, L could perhaps be one possible candidate. But of course this requires one to favour (1) the uniqueness thesis; (2) the idea of logicality being systematicity; (3) the Church-Turing thesis that systematicity is captured by Turing machines; and (4) the position that L should be a system capturing Turing computation in some fundamentally natural way. The naturality could be due to the links between L and natural language and the apparent minimality of L in achieving its central features such as the structure modification capacities, self-reference, and the containment of FO. This can be quite a lot to entertain, but seems interesting nevertheless.
Controlling systems with L and its variants
We have already noticed that the semantic games of L are system evolutions. This is easy to see-and the system related to one evaluation task (i.e., checking, e.g., if M |= + ϕ) can be realized in many ways. Roughly, we can take Eloise to be the sole agent and associate Abelard with G. 49 The system constraint function F relates to the constraints given by the formula evaluated (and the semantic game rules together with the input models). This is a turn-based game, so we need dummy moves. The current world is the current model assignment pair, and we can put the remaining situation specification (where the game is in relation to the evaluated formula, and who is the current verifier) into mental models. 50
This phenomenon has a converse. A typical system controllable by Turing machines can reasonably naturally be simulated relatively closely in a setting with a semantic game of L. The key feature of L is the looping operator, allowing semantic games with indefinitely long plays. The other key feature is the possibility to modify models and thereby simulate phenomena relating to the structure evolution in the system modeled. Typically Eloise controls the main agents for most parts. The choices of the agents can be represented by direct modifications of the current model. If necessary, we can add a some novel points and a predicate A that those points satisfy, and then choices can be represented by, e.g., colouring the elements in A with different singleton predicates. Intuitively, Abelard controls G and modifies the structures so that the new current models become as desired. However, many kinds of modeling solutions can be made, based on what kinds of correspondences between the original game and the semantic game are desired. Note that there is no explicit winning notion in any way present in systems, while semantic games are reachability games. Nevertheless, Eloise and Abelard are free to make any choices within the rules of the semantic game framework, and indeed, they are not obliged to try to win the game plays.
To allow more flexibility in model constructions with L, we consider an extension L[ ; ]. The language is obtained by extending that of L by the formula construction rule stating that if ψ and ϕ are formulae, then so is ψ ; ϕ. Intuitively, ';' is a composition operator stating that the left formula must first be checked and then the right one, but ';' also intuitively corresponds to a conjunction. Formally, if we encounter ψ ; ϕ, we first play the game for ψ (with the model and assignment as they are when the formula ψ ; ϕ 49 It can also be natural to associate different operators (∃x1, ∃x2, I R(x 1 ,...,xn) etc.) with different agents. Here one may even want to take into account the polarity of the operator in each turn, i.e., whether Eloise or Abelard uses the operator, and associate different modes of use with different agents. Also, a different occurrence (token) of the same operator in the same formula can be associated with a different agent.
50 They can be made part of the current model as well.
is encountered). The current verifier P (Eloise or Abelard) of ψ ; ϕ has the task to win the play of the game for ψ. If that play for ψ ends so that P wins, the game play is continued from ϕ with the possibly modified model and assignment 51 and with P being the verifier for ϕ (despite the possible changes of verifier in the play for ψ). If the play for ψ does not end, then neither player wins the entire original play, and if the opponent of P wins the play for ψ, then the original play ends with the opponent winning. Note that ψ may have further symbols ';' and jump symbols C i (so we may even, e.g., encounter the very same formula ψ ; ϕ again due to a jump). Each encounter of ';' has to be resolved first before earlier encounters (that have occurred earlier in the run of the game play) will be returned to for checking the second formula ϕ. 52 The full game history can be used here to define strategies; in standard L a positional history is the standard option. Nondeterministic strategies can be allowed, being winning if every path leads to a win. and M so that the set of models where the plays end with that strategy is precisely M. Note that different strategies can produce different sets. Here we ignore all the symbols outside the signature (firstorder variables and the relation symbols X corresponding to tape symbols) so the signature of models in M is the same as that of M. There may be other symbols present (e.g., X) in the final model constructions, but they do not count.
We say that a nondeterministic TM computes a σ-structure relation if for every finite σ-structure encoding enc(M) given as input, the machine always halts (on every computation path) and the collection of the outputs is enc(N 1 ), . . . , enc(N k ) for some σ-structures N 1 , . . . , N k . Furthermore, for every M ′ isomorphic to M, the output collections with inputs enc(M) and enc(M ′ ) contain representatives of precisely the same isomorphism classes. Now, for any TM computing a σ-structure relation, there exists a formula ϕ of L[ ; ] such that the following conditions both hold for all finite σ-structures M.
1. TM produces, on the input enc(M), encodings of models that define precisely the collection K M of isomorphism classes.
The way to establish this is to define a formula ϕ that forces the following construction. Beginning with the input model M, the formula ϕ forces Eloise to construct the computation table with the input enc(M). The newly constructed model S has the input model M, the computation table consisting of word models, and one chosen output model N.
(The construction allows all of the desired output models to be chosen, one output model at a time.)
The computation table as well as M and the output model are coupled with suitable auxiliary relations so that, e.g., the first and last bit strings in one branch of the computation table represent the word models corresponding to enc(M) and enc(N). Also other auxiliary constructs can be added, e.g., to distinguish the original elements of the input model from the newly added domain elements. The computation table and the auxiliary relations can be constructed from tape symbol predicates, but the output model N consists of signature relations. Once this construction S is ready, a first-order formula ψ is evaluated. The first-order formula asserts that the computation table and the whole construction is as desired. 53 Then the undesired part (i.e., everything but N) is deleted and finally Eloise wins. All this can be done using the composition operator which prevents Abelard stopping Eloise before suitable construction and deletion parts are done. Using the auxiliary tape symbol predicates helps to distinguish between different construction parts at different stages of the full procedure.
We note that of course the above construction generally requires looping. And the construction remotely resembles the way the logic L RE of [10] achieves Turing-completeness; cf. Proposition 2 there. The logic L RE is based on an opertor IY that adds a finite set of points to the model and labels the new points with the unary predicate Y .
It is actually interesting to consider further operators and extensions of that framework. Firstly, one can allow (1) free use of operators IY , rather than the prenex restricted single operator allowed in L RE . Furthermore, one can consider (2) an operator D that simply deletes some number of points from the model domain; (3) operators (IR) that introduce an arbitrary set of tuples to the relation R within the current model; and (4) an operator (DR) that deletes an arbitrary set of tuples from the relation R. We conjecture that adding all these to second-order logic leads to a system that corresponds to the arithmetic hierarchy (in expressivity) in the finite. Of course one needs to deal again with atoms with first-order variables without a reference. A natural approach here is to define all such atoms false, so atoms would basically state the additional condition that the symbols in the atom have referents, resembling the Russelian approach. This strong but seemingly simple system is very flexible in relation to model constructions, and especially its fragments are immediately interesting. 54
To define more custom-made logics than the very general logics based on L, let us turn to fragments and further variants. To investigate model transformations, let us define modifiers. These can be used for jumps from models to other models, similarly to what happens in L. Modifiers are defined as follows. Let S be a class of pairs (M, X) where M is a first-order structure and X an assignment; X can also be a team or a domain point, depending on the exact application. Futhermore, to streamline our exposition, (M, X) can even represent a class of structures (N, f ) where N is a first-order model and f an assignment. Such classes (called model sets) are considered in [12] . Now, fix one of the above possible interpretations for structures (M, X). We note that of course we can also considerDY which simply deletes the points in the extension of the unary relation Y and an operator I that simply adds new domain points to the model without labeling them. Modifications can also be restricted to the extension of an input formula. This defines variants of the operators we listed, for example I(ϕ(x, y), R) χ would add all pairs that satisfy ϕ(x, y) to the binary relation R, and a similar deletion operation of course would also be natural. Concerning domain points, the formula D(ψ(x)) χ would delete the points that satisfy ψ(x). And the list goes on. After the modification in each case, χ would be evaluated. To go more directly beyond first-order logic, one could consider variants where only some nondeterministically chosen set of tuples/points in the extensions could be added/deleted. assignments, then they correspond to singleton teams, so the above specification suffices to define ∼ =. If U and V are domain points, they correspond to singleton assigments, so again the case is covered. In the case of model sets T and T ′ , we have an isomorphism if there is a bijective map g from T to T ′ such that (N, f ) is isomophic to g((N, f )) for all inputs (N, f ) to g.
Modifiers are a simple way to jump from structures to others. Altering things a bit, define (M, X) |= m ϕ iff (N, Y ) |= ϕ for some (N, Y ) ∈ m((M, X)). One can also consider variants with, e.g., "most." Going further, fix some Boolean formula B with k proposition symbols. Define (M, X) |= ((F ))(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) if and only if the Boolean combination B of the statements
(for all j and all inputs to h).
This last notion of a modifier is quite general, but it still modifies models independently of the input formulae ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k . And there are other limitations. Thus let us define a somewhat more general notion. Let G be a function from S × (P(S)) k into P((P(S)) 2k ). Intuitively, G takes as input the current structure (M, X) and the truth classes
The output of G, then, is a collection of 2k-tuples (R
There should be at least one tuple so that each model in R + i satisfies ϕ i while no model in R − i satisfies ϕ i . Intuitively, each tuple approximates a type consisting of simple satisfaction and negative satisfaction statements. Thus the collection that G outputs corresponds to a disjunction of types (or type approximations). So, we indeed define (M, X) |= ((G))(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) if and only if for some t :
Again of course some invariance conditions hold for G. We require that if (M, X) ∼ = (M ′ , X ′ ), then there exists a bijection
such that for all tuples t ∈ G (M, X), ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , and all j ≤ 2k, there exists a bijection p from the jth entry of t to the jth entry of h(t) so that each model (N, Y ) in the domain of p is isomorphic to p((N, Y )).
Such modifiers G are reasonably general, so we call such modifiers g-modifiers, g for general. Other kinds of invariance conditions could be natural, but we shall not address that issue here further than a short comment later on below.
We consider one more notion of very closely related operators. We define operators N such that
if and only if ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ∈ N (M, X) . Here N maps from S into P((P(S)) k ). A natural invariance here is that if (M, X) and (M ′ , X ′ ) are isomorphic, then there is a bijection h from N (M, X) to N (M ′ , X ′ ) such that for all t ∈ N ((M, X)), the jth entry of t and the jth entry of h(t) are related by a bijection p such that the structures linked via p are isomorphic. This resembles neighbourhood semantics. We note that it is of course not necessary to impose the above invariance conditions if not desired, but that may result in isomorphic structures (M, X) and (M ′ , X ′ ) being non-equivalent.
We note that the above classes of logical constructs (i.e., operators and modifiers) can be equivalently formulated in terms of functions on isomorphism classes. We say that F and G are i-similar if they are the same modulo modifying the involved structures to isomorphic ones. It is also worth noting that natural construct classes arise, e.g., by considering which constructs are the same modulo permutation of variables (i.e., a bijection from the set VAR of all variable symbols to VAR itself). F and G are x-similar if they are the same modulo variable permutations. F and G are similar if they are the same modulo modifying the involved structures to isomorphic ones and permuting variables. All the three notions of similarity define relevant classes of logical constructs that are, in some senses, the same, or have the same base construct.
Classifying modifiers via L and L[ ; ] can be elucidating and useful, as those logics modify models one tuple and one domain point at a time. Already the self-reference-free fragment of L defines a natural and highly comprehensive class of simple, finite step modification procedures. Nevertheless, modifiers can be natural in many contexts. For example, for more flexible studies of formal systems (as defined above), it would be useful to investigate extensions of L and its variants with more custom-made model modification steps.
Let us then move on to briefly discuss model sets. The discussion will relate to knowledge representation and the issues in Section 3.3. Suppose we consider systems where the mental model is the conceived set of possible current models. This is a classical approach. Now, for those systems, we can directly use model sets [12] . Using the team semantics of [12] on a first-order formula ϕ, we have
where M is a model set, i.e., a collection of pairs (M, f ) where f is an assignment. As established in [12] , this variant of team semantics gives essentially a semantics for proofs. Disjunction corresponds to splitting into cases and negation to going from verification to falsification. In Section 3.3 we discussed the possibility of using truncated reasoning when determining the output of the decision function d i . A semantics for proofs can be useful in this context, as typical proof steps-such as splitting into cases-are reflected in the semantics. It is interesting, e.g., to consider what can be established with a strongly limited number of such semantic counterparts of proof steps. All this directly relates to issues in knowledge representation. Let (σ, O, q(x)) be an ontology-mediated query (see [2] ). Here we define O to be an ontology (possibly in some strong logic), σ a signature and q(x) a query over σ ∪ signature(O). Let F be a σ-database, i.e., a set of literals 55 over the signature σ. Let a be a tuple of elements occurring in F. We here define that F |= [14] .) As already discussed, all this can be useful when considering different reasoning notions with limited reasoning capacities and truncated reasoning patterns. Note that, if desired, we can put even quite severe cardinality limits to the models in the model set. And we can stay in the finite if we want to. If we want more complex data than literals, an approach via model sets can still be used. It is simply about delicate consequence relations, and model sets relate directly to those.
To seriously study delicate consequence relations used in knowledge representation, one must understand very delicate fragments of FO and L, as this helps in various kinds of classification attempts. For example, antecedent formulae could be only atoms, while consequent formulae are more elaborate. For such studies, we need tools for flexible, fine-grained classification. To classify logics in a flexible, delicate and very fine-grained way, it would be beneficial to have access to related algebraic approaches. These are not difficult to obtain. In the next section we take some related first steps.
First-order logic and extensions via functions on relations
Here we define an algebraic approach to first-order logic. The system resembles the approach of Codd, but employs a finite signature and considers standard first-order logic It is also very close to predicate functor logic, but we also consider some extensions of the system below.
The key is to deal with identities and relation permutations by operations that operate only in the beginning of tuples. We can arbitrarily permute any tuple by combining swaps of the first two coordinates with a cyclic permutation operation. Furthermore, we can identify (i.e., force equal) any two tuple elements by first bringing the elements to the beginning of a tuple and then applying an identity operation that checks only the first two coordinates. What we formally mean by these claims will be of course made clear below.
A first-order formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) defines the relation
. This requires that the free variable symbols x i are linearly ordered. Here we let the linear ordering be associated with the subindices of the variable symbols. Now, what would be the relation defined by the formula ϕ(x 2 , . . . , x k+1 )? It would be natural to let it be {(a 2 , . . . , a k+1 ) ∈ A k | A |= ϕ(a 2 , . . . , a k+1 ) }.
This is precisely the same relation as the relation given by ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) because we obviously have {(a 2 , . . . , a k+1 ) | A |= ϕ(a 2 , . . . , a k+1 ) } = {(a 1 , . . . , a k ) | A |= ϕ(a 1 , . . . , a k ) }.
One way around this is to let formulae define sets of assignment functions, i.e., the "relation" defined by ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) over A is now
And the "relation" defined by ϕ(x 2 , . . . , x k+1 ) over A is
So, in some sense, first-order formulae do not really define relations over models but sets of assignments (which could be characterized as index labeled relations.) 56
Now, we shall here work with relations, not sets of assignments. The relation defined by a first-order formula ϕ in a model A is, strictly speaking, specified as follows.
1. Let (x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) enumerate exactly all the free variables in ϕ, with the subindices i 1 , . . . , i k given in a strictly increasing order.
2. Then the relation defined by ϕ is given by
Therefore, the relations defined by the (strictly speaking non-equivalent) formulae ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) and ϕ(x 2 , . . . , x k+1 ) will be the same. Note that the relation defined by a sentence ϕ such that A |= ϕ is the nullary relation {∅} where ∅ represents the empty tuple. The relation defined by a sentence χ such that A |= χ is the nullary empty relation. We suppose there is a different empty relation for each arity, starting with arity zero. This way the complement of the completement of the total k-ary relation is the total k-ary relation itself. We lose no information about the arity. We also assume that models must have a non-empty domain.
We will next define functions that map relations in A to relations in A.
We will then show that this approach defines exactly the same relations as first-order logic.
Functions on relations
Consider the algebraic signature (u, I, ¬, p, s, ∃, J) where 1. u is a nullary symbol, 57 2. I, ¬, p, s, ∃ have arity one, 3. J has arity two.
To consider models with relation symbols R 1 , . . . , R k , add R 1 , . . . , R k to be nullary symbols in the algebraic signature, just like u. Terms are built from variable symbols and the constants (nullary symbols u, R 1 , . . . , R k ) using the symbols I, ¬, p, s, ∃, J in the usual way to compose new terms. Below we will consider only terms without variable symbols and use the word "term" to refer to such terms.
Given a model A, every term T defines some relation T A ⊆ A k where A is the domain of A. Let us look at the semantics of terms. Let T be a term and suppose we have defined a relation T A . Then the following conditions hold.
R i ) Here R i is a k-ary relation symbol in the signature of A, which is a nullary term in the algebraic signature. The nullary term is interpreted to be the relation R A , i.e., the relation {(a 1 , . . . , a k ) | A |= R(a 1 , . . . , a k ) }.
This is natural indeed. 58 u ) We define u A = A. The constant u is referred to as the universal unary relation constant.
I ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define (I (T )) A = {(a 1 , . . . , a k ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ T A and a 1 = a 2 }.
If T A is a unary or a nullary relation, we define (I (T )) A = T A . The function I is referred to as the identity operator, or equality operator.
¬ ) We define
(¬(T )) A = {(a 1 , . . . , a k ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ A k \ T A },
where we recall that A 0 = {∅} in the case where k is zero. 59 The operator ¬ is referred to as the negation operator or complementation operator. Recall that the empty relation is different for each arity.
p ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define (p(T )) A = {(a 2 , . . . , a k , a 1 ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ T A },
where the k-tuple (a 2 , . . . , a k , a 1 ) is the one obtained from the k-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a k ) by simply moving the first element a 1 to the end of the tuple. If T A is a unary or a nullary relation, we define (p(T )) A = T A . The function p is referred to as the permutation operator, or cyclic permutation operator.
s ) If T A is of arity at least two, we define (s(T )) A = {(a 2 , a 1 , a 3 , . . . , a k ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ T A },
where the k-tuple (a 2 , a 1 , a 3 , . . . , a k ) is the one obtained from the ktuple (a 1 , . . . , a k ) by swapping the first two elements a 1 and a 2 and keeping the other elements as they are. If T A is a unary or a nullary relation, we define (s(T )) A = T A . The function s is referred to as the swap operator.
∃ ) If T A has arity at least one, we define (∃(T )) A = {(a 2 , . . . , a k ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ T A for some a 1 ∈ A },
where (a 2 , . . . , a k ) is the (k − 1)-tuple obtained by removing the first element of the tuple (a 1 , . . . , a k ). When T A is a nullary relation, we define (∃(T )) A = T A . The function ∃ is referred to as the existence operator.
J ) We define (J(T , S)) A = {(a 1 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) | (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ T A and (b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) ∈ S A }.
Here we note that if k = 0 and thus (a 1 , . . . , a k ) = ∅ (the empty tuple), then (a 1 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) represents the tuple (b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ). Similarly, if ℓ = 0, then (b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) = ∅ and (a 1 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) represents (a 1 , . . . , a k ). When both k and ℓ are zero, (a 1 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b ℓ ) represents the empty tuple ∅. The function J is referred to as the join operator.
59 When k = 0, the tuple (a1, . . . , a k ) represents the empty tuple ∅.
The terms that can be formed using the above symbols will be called l-terms (l for logic). If ϕ and an l-term define exactly the same relation over every model A (in a signature interpreting the required symbols), then ϕ and the l-term are called l-equivalent.
The following theorem bears some similarity to Codd's theorem. However, we discuss standard first-order logic and have a somewhat different operator set (and we concentrate on relations rather than sets of assignments). Our signature is finite (provided that there are only finitely many relation symbols R i in the signature of the models A considered).
Theorem 4.2. For every first-order formula ϕ, there exists an l-equivalent l-term. Vice versa, for every l-term, there exists an l-equivalent first-order formula.
Proof. Let ϕ be a first-order formula. We need to find the corresponding algebraic term. If ϕ is ⊤, the corresponding term is ∃u, and if ϕ is ⊥, the term is ¬∃u. If ϕ is some formula x = x, then the term u will do. If ϕ is a formula x = y, then the corresponding term is I (J(u, u) ).
Now suppose ϕ is R(x i 1 , . . . , x i k ), where k ≥ 0. Assume first that no variable symbol in the tuple (x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) gets repeated. 60 Assume also that the (subindices of the) variable symbols in (x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) are linearly ordered (i.e., strictly increasing) from left to right. Then the term corresponding to ϕ is simply R.
Consider then the cases where the tuple (x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) in R(x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) may contain repetitions and the variables may not necessarily be in an increasing order. Firstly, note that we can permute any relation arbitrarily by using the operators p and s. To see this, note the following two facts.
1. In a tuple (a 1 , . . . , a i , . . . , a ℓ ), we can move the element a i any number n of steps to the right-keeping the tuple otherwise in the same orderas follows.
(a) Apply p repeatedly so that a i becomes the leftmost element. (b) Apply the composed function ps (meaning "s first and then p") exactly n times. (c) Repeatedly apply p until the tuple is in the desired configuration.
2.
Moving a i to the left is no different from moving it to the right, as moving to the left corresponds to moving to the right and past the end of the tuple. Thus moving n steps to the left is achieved by the above steps a,b,c, with the combined function ps applied exactly ℓ − n − 1 times in step b.
Thus we can move a single element anywhere, keeping the rest of the tuple in order. Thereby we can, one by one, move elements where we like, and thus all permutations can indeed be achieved using s and p only.
Notice then that since we can permute relations arbitrarily, also repetitions of variables can be dealt with. The idea is simply to bring element pairs to the left end of tuples, after which we can use the indentity operator I to get rid of tuples without the desired repetition. For example, it is easy to see that R(x 2 , x 1 , x 2 ) corresponds to the term p ∃ Ip p(R). It is easy to see how to systematically produce translations of all atoms by using combinations of p, s, ∃ and I.
To translate a conjunction, suppose by induction that we have translations T (ψ) and T (χ) for ψ and χ. Let ψ ∧ χ be the formula ϕ to be translated. Now, J(T (ψ), T (χ)) is almost what we need. The only thing we need additionally to take into account is the possibility of having repeated symbols that occur in both ψ and χ and also the ultimate order of the variable symbols. Thus, similarly to the case for atoms, we apply p, s, ∃ and I (often repeatedly) to the term J(T (ψ), T (χ)) to get the required term.
Translating a negation is trivial, we translate ¬ψ to the term ¬(T (ψ)) where T (ψ) is obtained from the induction hypothesis. Translating a quantifier ∃x i is similarly easy. However, we may first have to do some preprocessing as the variable x i can refer to some other than the first position in the relation corresponding to the quantified formula. Thus, suppose we want to translate ∃x i ψ and we have a translation T (ψ) of ψ by the induction hypothesis. Now use p (typically repeatedly) to make the coordinate corresponding to x i the leftmost coordinate in the relation tuples, obtaining a term p n (T (ψ)), where n denotes how many times p was repeated. Then use ∃ and use p again (typically repeatedly) to put the remaining tuple into the right order. Thus the ultimate term is of type p m ∃ p n (T (ψ)).
The direction from terms to first-order logic is straightforward.
This representation of first-order logic can be used to obtain very fine-grained classifications of first-order fragments. Thus it can be a fruitful starting point for novel classifications of different decidability and complexity issues of first-order fragments. 61 For example, it seems plausible to expect that some fragments with fluted-logic-like properties can be obtained via dropping the swap operator s. Anyway, there are many ways to directly apply the framework, and it should be a nice and useful setting for building decidability and complexity classifications based on simply and clearly specified finegrained classifications of syntax.
The algebraic approach generalizes to second-order logic quite directly. There we can make use of relations whose tuples have individuals and relations. We leave this for later. Instead, let us define a general operator within this framework. It is now particularly easy as the algebraic framework is indeed very simple. So, let F be a map that takes as input any tuple (M, R 1 , . . . , R k ) where M is a set and each R i a relation over M . Note that the collection of inputs is indeed all tuples (M, R 1 , . . . , R k ) so the relations R i can have any sequence of arities for different inputs (but k is fixed). The output F ((M, R 1 , . . . , R k )) is then some relation over M . The invariance condition is simply that if (M, R 1 , . . . , R k ) and (M ′ , R ′ 1 , . . . , R ′ k ) are isomorphic 62 via f : M → M ′ , then so are (M, F ((M, R 1 , . . . , R k ))) and (M, F ((M ′ , R ′ 1 , . . . , R ′ k ))) (also via f ). We now add terms F (t 1 , . . . , t k ) to the picture, and the semantics obviously defines (F (t 1 , . . . , t k )) M to be F (t M 1 , . . . , t M k ).
